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Popular elections are the central political act of democracies2, and citizens in all 
advanced democracies organize their political competition through parties that compete 
in general elections.   While political historians have studied parties for many years, it is 
remarkable that only in the last decade or so have there been serious attempts at abstract 
conceptualizations – that is, formal models—of  inter and intra party competition in a 
democracy.  In this chapter, I will report on the attempts to model political equilibrium 
among parties and its applications.  Indeed, it appears that a satisfactory model of inter-
party competition can only be constructed by paying careful attention to intra-party 
competition between conflicting interests or factions. 
In the advanced democracies, between 27 and 50 percent of the gross national 
product is collected through taxation and disbursed by the state, and state policies are 
decided, ultimately, by popular elections.   We no longer view the state as a benevolent 
social planner, which maximizes some social welfare function whose arguments are the 
utilities of its citizens; rather, in the new political economy,  the state is pictured as 
implementing the favored policies of whichever coalition of citizens manages to win 
control of it.  (In one extreme view, that coalition could be the bureaucrats who run the 
                                                 
1 Forthcoming in the Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. 
2 After William Riker(1982).  
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state.)   Thus, the theory of political competition should be, and is becoming in fact, a 
sub-field of public economics.   
Furthermore, the issues with which the state deals are myriad, involving law, 
religion, language, and ethnic and racial conflict, as well as traditional economic issues of 
taxation and the provision of public goods.This means that any realistic theory of political 
competition must represent parties as taking positions in a multi-dimensional policy 
space.    
Yet the most commonly used theory of political competition, of Harold 
Hotelling[1929], later elaborated by Anthony Downs[1957], with its principal result, the 
so-called median voter theorem, posits unidimensional political competition.   Moreover, 
many  believe that the Arrow Impossibility Theorem tells us that there can be no theory 
of multi-dimensional political competition – that there is no satisfactory procedure 
whereby citizens can aggregate their preferences to decide upon which multi-dimensional 
policy will be implemented.  Our aim in this article is to rectify these Downsian and 
Arrovian pessimisms. 
We will begin by introducing some notation, and then proceed to a review of the 
two main theories of political competition when it is assumed that the policy space is 
unidimensional.  We will then note the problems involved in generalizing these theories 
to the multi-dimensional context, and propose a resolution to these problems, a theory of 
multi-dimensional political competition.  Finally we will discuss some applications of 
this theory, and pose some open questions. 
 
2.  The political environment  
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We model a polity as follows.  There is a  policy space T, a subset of some n-
dimensional real space.  There is a set of voter types, denoted H, which is a sample space 
endowed with a probability measure F.   A voter of type h has preferences over the policy 
space represented by a utility function v(⋅;h) , on T.    
 In the simplest economic application, we might think of h as describing a citizen’s 
income or wealth and her preference for public goods, and T as a set of vectors each of 
which specifies some tax policy and supply of public goods.     Given any tax policy t, the 
voter’s after-tax income will be determined, as will be the supply of public goods, 
engendering a utility level for this citizen. v(t;h)  is the utility citizen h enjoys at policy t;  
the function v is thus an indirect utility function, derived from the citizen’s direct utility 
function over consumption of private and public goods. 
 Suppose the voters face two policies, t1 and t 2.  The set of voter types who prefer 
the first policy to the second is denoted: 
 W (t1, t 2) ={h | v(t1,h) > v(t 2,h)} . 
If everyone votes, then the fraction voting for t1 should be F(W (t1, t 2)) , and if these are 
the only two policies in the election, then t1 wins exactly when F(W (t1, t 2))  > 0.53.    
 In reality, however, the outcomes of elections are uncertain, because not everyone votes, 
not everyone is rational, random shocks may occur, and so on.  We wish to capture this 
uncertainty in a simple way.  We suppose that the fraction who will, in the event, vote for 
policy t1 is F(W (t1, t 2))  + X, where X is a random variable that is uniformly distributed 
on some interval [−δ,δ], where δ is a (fairly small) positive number.   Think of δ as the 
                                                 
3 F is a probability measure, not a distribution function.  Thus F(A) is the fraction of the 
polity whose type is in the set A. 
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error term that newspapers report, when they say  “We estimate that 53% will vote 
Democratic, but our forecast is subject to a 4% margin of error.”    Translation: 
F(W (t1, t 2))  = 0.53 and δ=.04.  We can now compute the probability that t1 will win the 
election: it is  
 





−F(W (t1,t 2)] =
0 if F(W (t1, t2)) ≤ 1
2
 -δ
δ + F(W (t1,t 2)) − 1
2
2δ
,  if 
1
2
-δ ≤ F(W (t1, t2))
















   
(1)    
This formula is derived as follows.  The fraction of the vote for policy t1 can fall 
anywhere between F(W (t1,t2)) −δ and F(W (t1,t 2)) +δ , and it is uniformly distributed on 
this interval, by hypothesis.   We simply compute the fraction of this interval that lies 
above 0.5; this produces formula (1). We denote the above probability by π(t1,t 2) .     
 If we apply formula (1) to the newspaper report quoted above, then we see that 
the probability of Democratic victory is 0.875. When the fraction of voters voting for  t1 
ranges from 49 to 57 percent, 7/8 or 87.5% of the time the fraction will be larger than 
50%. 
 Although I suggested that δ is a small number,  note that it is really appropriate to 
measure uncertainty, from the parties’ viewpoints, at the time that they announce their 
policies.  The party manifestoes, or the party conventions, typically take place months 
before the elections, when uncertainty may be substantial.  Consequently, the appropriate 
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δ could be fairly large; there could be at that time substantial uncertainty concerning the 
election outcome. 
 Because we wish to model large polities, where no type is of noticeable size in the 
entire population,  the default assumption is that H is a continuum of types, and F  is a 
continuous probability measure.  Note that, even with a continuum of types, uncertainty 
in the outcome of voting does not disappear in our model.  We assume that the random 
variable X applies, as defined above. The interpretation must be that the ‘misbehavior’ of 
voters is correlated, it is not i.i.d. across voters.  This may be because a scandal occurs in 
a campaign, which will cause some unpredictable faction of voters to vote ‘against’ their 
supposed preferences, or because one candidate is more telegenic than another.  In sum, it 
is reasonable that uncertainty concerning the outcome of the elections is produced by 
shocks that correlate deviations by voters from ‘rational’ behavior in the same direction.  
So even when there is a very large number of voter types, and large numbers of voters in 
each type, uncertainty does not disappear. Because of uncertainty, it will sometimes be 
appropriate to assume that v(⋅ ;h) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility function 
on the policy space. 
 
3.  Unidimensional political competition 
 We now specialize to the case that T is an interval of real numbers: a 
unidimensional policy space.    For example, T might be the interval [0,1], and t ∈ [0,1] 
could be proportional income tax rate. 
 Suppose that the functions {v(⋅;h) | h ∈ H} are all single-peaked on T: that is, 
each function has a unique local maximum on T, which is also its global maximum. 
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Suppose there are two political candidates: each wishes to propose the policy that will 
maximize his probability of victory, given what the other candidate is proposing.   In 
other words, if Candidate 2 proposes t 2 , then Candidate 1 will choose  
 t to maximize π(t,t2)  
and if Candidate 1 chooses t1 then Candidate 2 will choose: 
 t to maximize 1-π(t1,t). 









If the functions {v(⋅;h) | h ∈ H} are single-peaked, then Hotelling(1929) showed there is 
a unique such equilibrium: both candidates must play the policy that is the median in the 
set of ideal policies of all voters: that is, t1 = t 2 = t *, where t* has the property that 
exactly one-half of the set of types has an ideal policy at least large as t* and exactly one-
half of the set of types has an ideal policy no larger than t*.   
 Neither Hotelling nor Downs had uncertainty in the model, as we do, but the 
extension of the ‘median voter theorem’ to our environment, with uncertainty, is 
immediate.    Writing before Nash, Hotelling of course did not speak of Nash 
equilibrium.  In fact, the Hotelling equilibrium is a dominant strategy equilibrium, a 
simpler concept than Nash equilibrium. However, when we introduce uncertainty, we 
must resort to the full power of Nash equilibrium to deduce the ‘median voter theorem.’ 
 There are two central problems with Hotelling-Downs equilibrium as a 
conceptualization of political competition: the first is its realism, the second is 
mathematical.  The reality problem is that political parties, the soul of democracy, have 
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not been modeled.  In fact, as Downs tells the story, the two candidates are completely 
opportunist: they have no interest in policies per se, and use them only as vehicles for 
winning the election.    To be precise, Downs does speak of parties, but his parties are 
evidently controlled completely by venal opportunistic politicians who have no 
accountability to constituents.  He writes: 
[Party members] act solely in order to obtain the income, prestige, and power 
which comes from being in office.  Thus politicians in our model never seek 
office as a means of carrying out particular policies; their only goal is to reap the 
rewards of holding office per se.  ….Upon this reasoning rests the fundamental 
hypothesis of our model: parties formulate policies in order to win elections, 
rather than win elections to formulate  policies [Downs, 1957, p. 28] 
 
Historically, however, parties are associated with particular ideologies -- presumably the 
views, or preferences, of the coalition of citizens whom they, in some way, represent.  So 
the Downsian model is missing something important -- perhaps the essence -- of 
democratic competition.  
 Indeed,  it is interesting -- and puzzling-- to compare the development of general 
equilibrium theory and formal political equilibrium theory, with respect to the issue of 
agency.  In the Arrow-Debreu model,  no agency problem is mentioned: it is assumed 
that firms maximize profits, without any friction between owners/shareholders and 
managers.  Not until the early 1970s did the principal-agent problem enter into formal 
economic theory -- although, of course, Berle and Means [1932] had discussed the 
problem of ownership vs. control much earlier.   In contrast, the first formal model of 
political competition, the Downs model,  assumes that political parties are completely in 
 8 
control of the agents,  the political entrepreneurs, who, somehow, completely escape  
supervision by their collective principal, the parties’ constituents. 
 In Downsian equilibrium, both candidates play a Condorcet winner in the policy 
space, a policy that defeats or ties all other policies.  Each candidate wins with 
probability one-half, if we assume that every voter casts her vote randomly, and the 
policies of both candidates are identical.  
The mathematical problem I alluded to above is that Downsian equilibrium does 
not generalize to the case of a multi-dimensional policy space.  If T is a subset of R2 or 
some higher dimensional space, there is in general no Nash equilibrium (in pure 
strategies) of the game in which each politician has, as her pay-off function, her 
probability-of-victory function.   Only in a singular case, first observed by Plott[1967], 
will an interior Nash equilibrium in this game exist.  (There may be a Nash equilibrium 
on the boundary of the policy space, if it is compact.  See Roemer[2001, Chapter 6] for 
details.) 
 Although historians and political scientists had (informally) studied parties with 
ideological commitments for many years, it appears that the first formal model of 
ideological parties by proposed by Donald Wittman (1973).  In that model, each party has 
a (von Neumann Morgenstern) utility function on policies, and seeks to maximize its 
expected utility, given the policy played by the opposition party.    Given parties called A 
and B, with utility functions vA : T → R ,vB : T → R , a Wittman equilibrium is a pair of 
policies (t A , tB ) such that: 
 tA solves max
t
π(t,t B )vA (t) + (1−π(t,t B ))vA (tB ), and 
 tB solves max
t
π(tA , t)vB (tA ) + (1−π(tA ,t))v B (t). 
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In other words,  it is a Nash equilibrium of the game played by expected-utility 
maximizing parties, where utility depends on policy outcomes.   
 Perhaps the central weakness in Wittman’s concept is that the parties’ utility 
functions are exogenous, so the model is incomplete.  To put it politically, parties do not 
represent citizens in the Wittman model.    Ortuño and Roemer (1998) remedied this as 
follows.   For any partition of the set of types, A ∪ B = H, A ∩ B = ∅ , define the utility 
functions 
 V A (t) = vh
h ∈ A
∫ (t)dF(h), V B (t) = vh
h ∈ B
∫ (t)dF(h) ; 
these are utility functions of two parties, should coalitions A and B form parties.  We say 
that a partition (A,B) and a pair of policies (t A , tB ) comprise an endogenous-party 
Wittman equilibrium (EPW) if: 
 (1) (t A , tB ) is a Wittman equilibrium for the utility functions (V A ,V B ), and 
 (2) 
h ∈ A ⇒ vh (t A ) ≥ vh (tB ),
h ∈ B ⇒ vh (tB ) ≥ vh (tA )
. 
Condition (1) says that each party maximizes the expected utility of an ‘average 
constituent’ of the party, facing the policy of the other party.  Condition (2) states that 
each citizen (weakly) prefers the policy of her own party to the policy of the other party.  
This condition means that each citizen will vote (modulo the uncertainty element) for the 
party that, by hypothesis, accepts him as a constituent.4.  In other words, at an EPW 
                                                 
4 Readers will note that for the integration of member utility functions, in constructing the 
party utility function, to be meaningful, member utility functions should be cardinally 
unit comparable.   There are other ways of aggregating member preferences into party 
preferences which avoid this, but I will not discuss them here (see Roemer[2001, section 
5.3]). 
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equilibrium, the set of voters for a party comprise exactly its constituency, and the party 
represents its constituency in the sense of maximizing their average expected utility. 
 There is (to date) no simple proof of equilibrium existence for EPW equilibrium, 
as there is for Downs equilibrium.    (There are some difficult proofs that are not 
completely general: e.g. see Roemer [2001, chapter 3].)  The difficulty comes from the 
fact that even with the kind of simple specification of the probability function that we 
have given, the conditional payoff functions of the parties are not quasi-concave, and so 
the premises of the usual fixed-point theorems do not hold.   Still, in practice, it seems 
that EPW equilibria exist whenever one has a specific environment to work with. 
 The EPW equilibrium is a self-contained concept: given only the political 
environment defined in section 2, equilibrium can be calculated.  In this sense, the 
concept has the same informational standing as Downs equilibrium.  Unlike Downs 
equilibrium, parties play different policies (generically) in EPW equilibrium, and so the 
concept provides an escape from the tyranny of the median voter.   It is also the case that, 
generically, parties do not win with probability one-half in EPW equilibrium: this, too, 
provides a realistic contrast to the Downsian prediction5.   
 Naturally, the EPW equilibrium concept is harder to work with than Downsian 
equilibrium: for applications that arise from particular economic environments, such as 
the determination of tax rates to finance public goods,  it is usually easy to compute the 
EPW equilibrium (on a computer), but the comparative statics are often difficult to 
deduce analytically: one must resort to simulation.   Political economists are in the habit 
                                                 
5 One reason that I have introduced uncertainty is that,  under  certainty, EPW  
equilibrium also consists in both parties proposing the same policy.  So to escape the 
unrealistic prediction of the Downsian model, one must introduce both parties that care 
about policies, and uncertainty. 
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of constructing politico-economic models that are quite complex on the economic side, 
and simplistic (that is, Downsian) on the political side.   To replace the political module 
of these models with EPW equilibrium will often complicate the analysis substantially.  I 
believe, however, that the extra effort is worth taking, because the EPW concept is the 
simplest model of party competition that we have.  Of course, it formulates an ideal view 
of representation -- every citizen ‘belongs’, or is represented by  a party, and each 
citizen’s influence on his party’s utility function is equal.  It is, however, a far better 
approximation to democratic reality than the Downs model. 
 I summarize one application, taken from Lee and Roemer (in press), to show the 
payoff of using EPW equilibrium in political economy.  The polity consists of workers 
and capital owners.  A worker’s type is her real wage or skill level; the distribution of real 
wages is given.  There is a trade union that represents all workers.  Two political parties 
form endogenously, which jointly represent all citizens.  In the equilibrium to be 
described, one party (the ‘left’) represents all workers whose real wage is less than some 
endogenously determined value, and the other party (‘right’) represents all more skilled 
workers and all capital owners.  A game will be played between the two parties and the 
union.  The union’s strategy is a mark-up on the Walrasian equilibrium wage, w,    of the 
worker whose skill is unity.  (Thus, if a worker’s skill is s, her Walrasian real wage will 
be sw.)  The mark-up determines the degree of unemployment, since firms choose their 
labor  demand to maximize profits.  The income tax rate, set by political competition, 
determines the size of government revenues,  which are used to finance an unemployment 
benefit for those who cannot find work at the non-Walrasian wages. 
 An endogenous party Wittman equilibrium is, in this case: 
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 (a) a skill level s*, defining two parties, L , consisting of all workers whose skill 
level is s ≤ s*, and a party R, consisting of all other workers and all capital owners; 
 (b) payoff functions for the two parties and the union, defined on vectors 
(t L ,t R ,λ), where tJ is the tax rate proposed by party J=L,R, and λ is the rate of 
unemployment, which can be viewed as the union’s strategy choice.  A party’s payoff 
function is the average expected utility of its members, and the union’s payoff function is 
the average expected utility of its members.  




,λ*) in the game played among the two parties and 
the union6; 
 (d) each party member (weakly) prefers her party’s policy to the opposition’s, 
given the equilibrium unemployment rate and mark-up. 
 We compare the welfare of citizens, in this equilibrium, to their welfare in a full-
employment Walrasian equilibrium.    This allows us to say something about why some 
societies have a highly unionized labor market, and some (such as the US), one with 
much less union strength.     We view the choice of ‘labor market regime’ as made by 
citizens.   If the majority of citizens fare better in the Walrasian equilibrium, we expect to 
have a quite unregulated labor market, whereas if the majority favor better in the union 
equilibrium described above, we expect to have highly regulated labor markets.  The 
main result is with regard to a comparative static that alters the degree of skill inequality 
among workers: . when that inequality coefficient is low or high, the majority of citizens 
prefer the unionized regime; when it has an intermediate value , the majority prefer the 
                                                 
6 There are two forms of uncertainty represented in the payoff function: first, the 
uncertainty associated with a citizen’s being unemployed or not, and second the  
uncertainty concerning the size of the tax rate and the unemployment benefit, deriving  
from electoral uncertainty. 
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Walrasian equilibrium.   Thus, the mapping from degree of skill inequality to choice of 
labor market regime is U - shaped.  We test for this result econometrically, and find 
support for it. 
 We also study the relationship between inequality and tax rates.  A number of 
authors have studied this question, using the Downsian model (Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994); Persson and Tabellini (1994)).   In those models, increasing inequality of skill 
engenders increasing tax rates. There is, however, an extensive empirical literature 
arguing that this does not hold in reality (for example, Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange 
(1991)).    In our model, the result is more nuanced: we find that as inequality of skill 
increases among workers,  the Left party proposes higher tax rates, while the Right party 
proposes lower tax rates.    Not only do the two parties propose different tax rates (unlike 
the Downsian model), but their proposals move in different directions as inequality 
changes.    We test this result econometrically, and find support for it.    
 Thus the feature of Wittman equilibrium, that parties generically propose different 
policies as long as there is some uncertainty, becomes important in explaining a ‘puzzle’ 
in the empirical literature. 
 The Downsian model, in other words,  mis-specifies the problem.  We claim that 
an understanding of the relationship between taxation and inequality requires specifying, 
as well, whether the Left or the Right party holds power.   
 
4. Multi-dimensional generalizations 
 As I said earlier, multi-dimensional political competition is ubiquitous.  And even 
if one is interested only in, say, tax policy, it would mis-specify the model to work with a 
 14 
unidimensional policy space, because the positions of voters on other issues will affect 
the equilibrium in tax policy.   As we will see, the preferences of voters on the religious 
issue or the race issue will significantly affect the equilibrium policies that emerge on 
economic issues.  So a proper specification of political competition requires a theory 
where parties compete on multi-dimensional policy spaces. 
 Unfortunately, neither the Downs nor the Wittman models generalizes in what I 
think is a satisfactory way  to multi-dimensional policy spaces7. Wittman equilibrium , or 
EPW equilibrium, sometimes exists on multi-dimensional policy spaces  but existence is 
undependable.   Interested readers are referred to Roemer [2001, section 8.5] for the 
details. Besides crafting the ‘probabilistic voting’ models referred to in the previous 
footnote, political scientists responded to the non-existence of Downsian equilibrium in 
the multi-dimensional environment in the following ways: 
•  mixed strategy equilibrium; 
•  sequential games; 
•  institutions; 
                                                 
7 Two very similar models of multi-dimensional Downs equilibrium were indeed 
proposed by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Enelow and Hinich (1989).  Coughlin 
(1992) also proposed a model  of this type.  Existence is secured by having voters behave 
probabilistically, in a way which ‘convexifies’ the conditional payoff functions of the 
Downsian parties.   Uncertainty exists about electoral outcomes, but only when the set of 
voters is finite.    Moreover, the equilibria have both parties playing the same policy, an 
unrealistic prediction that we wish to avoid.    
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•  the uncovered set; 
•  cycling. 
A quick summary: often a game without pure-strategy equilibria possesses mixed 
strategy equilibria.   But mixed strategy equilibrium is best justified by assuming that 
players do not know the types of other players.  In our case, the players are political 
parties, which are public institutions.   It is, I submit,  not reasonable to say that parties do 
not know each other’s preferences.  In the sequential game approach, one party moves 
first, and the other second, giving a Stackelberg equilibrium.  These often exist in multi-
dimensional policy spaces.  But I submit that it is more appropriate to model the game as 
one of simultaneous moves, and so I have not found the sequential-game approach to 
public elections convincing.  Shepsle[1979] is associated with the view that political 
equilibrium exists, in multi-dimensional contexts, because institutions restrict the moves 
that players can make.  Actually, Shepsle’s model is one of legislative equilibrium, not 
general elections.    In the legislative context, his approach is credible.  But concerning 
general elections, one still faces the fact that parties seems to be playing a fairly straight-
forward game with two players and simultaneous moves.  The uncovered set is a 
‘cooperative’ kind of solution concept; its logical foundations are suspect, and it is not  
strategic.  The uncovered set always contains the Condorcet winner if one exists, so it is, 
mathematically, a generalization of Downsian equilibrium.  (For critique, see 
Roemer[2001, section 8.1]. )  Finally, many political scientists took the non-existence of 
multi-dimensional equilibrium in the known models to mean that in reality there was no 
equilibrium in the party-competition game, and hence once should observe cycling: each 
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party plays its best response to the previous move of the other party, and this generates a 
sequence of moves which end only with the election.    
 An equilibrium theorist, however, does not conclude that if her model fails to 
produce equilibrium,  there is no equilibrium in the real world; this would be a last resort.  
Instead, she looks for another model.  The failure of the Downs and Wittman models 
does not necessarily tell us something about the world, but rather, something about the 
models.  For we do seem to observe equilibrium in real-world party competition. 
 In the last decade, two models have been offered that do produce political 
equilibrium with multi-dimensional policy spaces, in which parties propose different 
policies :  the party-faction model of Roemer (1998, 1999, 2001), and the citizen-
candidate model of Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate(1997).  I  will 
spend most of the remaining space discussing the party-faction model, because it appears 
to be more realistic, easier to work with, and has more applications at present than the 
citizen-candidate model.    I will  discuss the citizen-candidate model only briefly. 
 The party-faction model is a generalization of both the Downsian model and the 
EPW model: it contains both of them as special cases.  We assume, now, that the decision 
makers in parties form factions.   Each faction possesses its own pay-off function in the 
game of party competition.  Thus, as in the EPW model, let (A,B) be a partition of the 
space of types:   A ∪ B = H, A ∩ B = ∅ .   As before, we define the average utility 
functions of these two coalitions: 
 V A (t) = v(t;h)dF(h),
h ∈ A




The first faction in party A are the Opportunists; as in the Downsian model, they wish 
only to maximize the probability of their party’s victory against party B.  Thus, the pay-
off function of the Opportunists in A is: 
 OppΠ A (tA ,t B ) = π(t A ,tB )     (4.1) 
The second faction in A are the Reformists: they are the characters of the Wittman model, 
who wish to maximize the expected utility of the average party member.  Thus, their 
payoff function is: 
 Ref Π A (tA ,t B ) = π(t A , tB )V A (tA ) + (1−π(tA ,t B ))V A (tB ).            (4.2) 
The third faction in A are the Militants (or the Guardians): they are concerned with 
ideology only, and want to play a policy as close as possible to the ideal policy of the 
‘average’ party member.  Their payoff function is: 
 Mil Π A (t A ,tB ) =V A (tA )    (4.3) 
In like manner, party B has the analogous three factions. 
 Party factions are not to be associated with particular voter types.  The factions 
are formed by professional party activists, and are small relative to the size of the 
population. 
 The idea is that, while parties compete with each other strategically, factions 
within parties bargain with each other over policy.    I state the equilibrium concept and 
then explain it: 
 A partition of types (A,B) and a pair of policies (t A , tB ) comprise a party-
unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE) if: 
 (1) Given the policy tB, there is no policy t that all three factions of party A would 
prefer to play, instead of tA;    
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 (2) Given the policy tA   there is no policy t that all three factions of party B would 
prefer to play, instead of tB ; 
 (3) Every member of each party (weakly) prefers the policy of his party to the 
policy of the other party. 
 
 The phrase ‘that all three factions would prefer to play’ is short-hand for: ‘that all 
three factions would weakly prefer to play and at least one would prefer to play.’ 
 Requirement (1) means that, given policy tB, policy tA is Pareto-optimal for the 
three factions in A:  there is no policy choice that would increase all their payoffs.  We 
can thus think of tA as the outcome of efficient bargaining among the factions of A,  when 
facing tB.  In like manner, (2) means that policy tB is the outcome of efficient bargaining 
among the factions of B, when facing tA.     
 There is much historical evidence to justify the choice of these factions.  One 
could quibble,  and define other factions.  These three, however, seem fairly canonical.  It 
is the Militants who seem the most surprising.  There are, however, many examples of 
Militants in history.  The Militants’ strategy seems to be to use the elections as a platform 
for advertising the party’s preferences -- perhaps with an eye to changing the preferences 
of voters for future elections.   
 The interesting fact is that the Reformists are expendable (or gratuitous) in this 
equilibrium concept: that is to say, we get exactly the same set of equilibria if only the 
Opportunist and Militant factions are active in the parties.   The Reformists are, in an 
appropriate mathematical sense, just a convex combination of the Opportunists and the 
Militants. 
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 Although there is no satisfactory general existence theorem (as in the case with 
endogenous-party Wittman equilibrium), in all applications that I have studied on multi-
dimensional policy spaces, PUNEs exist.   Moreover, there is a two-dimensional 
manifold (set)of equilibria.  We can understand this as follows. 
 It turns out (see Roemer[2001, section 8.3]) that the bargaining that takes place in 
the intra-party faction struggle can be represented as generalized Nash bargaining, when 
appropriate convexity properties hold.   Take the threat point of the intra-party bargaining 
game in our party to be the bad situation that the opposition party wins for sure, because 
our party does not succeed in solving its bargaining problem and defaults.   In generalized 
Nash bargaining, the bargainers maximize the product, raised to some power, of their 




[π(t,t B ) −0]α [V A (t) −V A (tB )]1−α .  (4.4) 
Party B’s factions do the same thing.    So I am claiming that a PUNE can be expressed as 




π(t, tB )]α [V A (t) −V A (tB )]1−α ,
tB = argmax[
t ∈ T
1−π(tA , t)]β [V B (t) −V B (tA )]1−β
 
for some numbers α ,β  in [0,1].   
In words,  recall that, if party A fails to propose a policy, then its probability of 
victory is zero, and the utility of its average constituent will be V A (tB)  since party B will 
win for sure.  Thus expression (4.4) states that bargaining maximizes the weighted 
product of the ‘utility’ gains from the threat point of the Opportunist and Militant 
factions.  This, as I said earlier, is the upshot of the Nash bargaining game. 
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   We call α(β) the relative strength of the Opportunists in Party A (resp., B).   
Now if such a pair of policies exists for a particular  pair of numbers (α,β) then the 
implicit function theorem tells us (generically) that there will exist solutions for all values 
of the relative strengths in a small neighborhood of (α,β).   This describes the two 
dimensional manifold of PUNEs: each equilibrium is indexed by a pair of relative 
strengths of the factions in the intra-party bargaining game. 
 In other words, if we wanted to specify a particular pair of relative strengths of the 
factions in the two parties as a datum of the problem, we would have a unique 
equilibrium.   The problem is that, we cannot be guaranteed that an equilibrium will exist 
with any pre-specified pair of bargaining strengths.  
 In fact, it is easy to deduce that an endogenous party Wittman equilibrium is a 
PUNE where α = β = 1
2
, in other words, a PUNE where the Opportunists and Militants 
have equal strengths.  This is a nice characterization of Wittman equilibrium – indeed, 
one that applies as well in the unidimensional model.    Unfortunately, there is no 
guarantee that a PUNE with this pair of relative strengths exists when the policy space is 
multi-dimensional.  For some environments it does, and for others it does not. 
 Hence, PUNE is a generalization of Wittman equilibrium.  It is also a 
generalization a Downs equilibrium: set α = β =1 for Downs equilibrium.  We know, 
however, that this equilibrium rarely exists. 
 Here is a second story that gives rise to exactly the same equilibrium concept8.  
Each party has two factions, the Opportunists and the Guardians.  The Opportunists are as 
                                                 
8 It was remarked by Gérard Debreu that formal models often, virtuously, support several 
interpretations of reality.  Here is a case in point. 
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above; the Guardians insist that, whatever the Opportunists do, they (Guardians) will not 
accept a policy that would give their party’s constituents, on average, too low a utility.  






s.t. V A (t) ≥ kA
.   (4.5) 
The bigger the number kA, the tougher are the Guardians.  In like manner, party B’s 
bargaining problem is characterized by a number kB.    It is easy to see that there is a 2-
manifold of equilibria of this game, indexed by pairs of numbers (kA ,kB ), and that this 
manifold is identical to the PUNE manifold9.    
 Therefore we have the freedom to conceptualize the ‘tough’ guys in party 
bargaining as either Militants ( who use the party as a platform to advertise) or Guardians 
(who hold the fort in the interest of constituents).   Perhaps the Guardian story is more 
appealing. 
 As I said, I have no suitably general existence theorem for PUNE: all I can say is 
that in many applications that I have studied, PUNEs exist.   The intuition for existence is 
that it is much harder to find a successful deviation to a proposal in the PUNE game than 
in the Wittman or Downs game.  To deviate, two payoff functions must be satisfied -- and 
the Militants and Opportunists have sufficiently ‘orthogonal’ preferences that that is often 
hard to do.  So many pairs of policies survive the deviation test necessary to qualify as a 
Nash equilibrium. 
                                                 
9 One can check the claim that the two stories engender the same equilibria by noting that 
the first-order conditions for the solution of (4.4) and (4.5) are equivalent.  Of course, the 
same holds for the corresponding F.O.C.s for the B  party. 
 22 
 I now briefly describe citizen-candidate equilibrium, which is the second 
equilibrium concept that survives the generalization to multi-dimensional policy spaces 
and produces differentiated policies at equilibrium.  We begin with the same data 
(H,F,v,T) , which defines the environment.    Each citizen now considers whether or not 
to stand for election.  If a citizen enters the contest, she pays a cost, and if she wins, she 
enjoys a benefit from holding office, as well as deriving utility from implementing the 
policy upon which she ran.  It is assumed that , if a candidate stands for election, she 
must announce her ideal policy; to do otherwise would not be credible in this one-shot 
game.   An equilibrium consists of a set of citizens each of whom enters the race, and 
each announces her ideal policy.   Once the policies have been announced, we can 
compute the coalitions of citizens that will vote for each candidate, absent uncertainty.   
We can then append an element of uncertainty as we have above.   The equilibrium is a 
Nash equilibrium; to be so, it must satisfy two tests.   First, each candidate must not have 
higher expected utility, should he decide not to run.  (Under that deviation, he does not 
have to pay the cost of running, but forfeits the expected gain from winning.) Secondly, 
each non-candidate must not have higher utility should she throw her hat into the ring.  
The model generally possesses pure-strategy equilibria with a small set of candidates, 
even when the policy space is multi-dimensional.  Thus, both limitations of the Downs 
model are overcome, because candidates are explicitly ‘ideological,’ as well as caring 
about the spoils of office, and equilibria exist. 
 I see three problems with the model.  First, it is not a model of party competition, 
and so ignores the central institutions of democratic political competition.  Second, the 
model has too many equilibria.  Let the dimension of the policy space by n.  Then in a 
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canonical CC model, it turns out that the set of two-candidate equilibria is a manifold of 
dimension n2 -- that is, the equilibrium set is a set of full dimension in T ×T .  (See 
Roemer [2003].)   This is to be contrasted with PUNE, in which the equilibrium set (with 
two parties) is always of dimension two, regardless of the size of the policy space.   
Thirdly, the element of compromise in political competition is ignored, in the sense that 
each candidate proposes her ideal policy.  The justification of this move is that the game 
is one-shot, and candidates cannot commit themselves to do otherwise.  This strikes me 
as unrealistic, even if it is logically consistent within the framework of a one-shot game.   
In the PUNE model, parties do compromise, although we ignore the credibility of their 
proposing non-ideal policies in a one-shot game.  (There is, indeed,  a [locally] unique  
equilibrium in the PUNE model where both parties play the ideal point of their average 
member, but I consider this to be  an uninteresting equilibrium.) 
 
5.  Applications 
Two of the virtues of the PUNE model are that it is often possible to derive 
interesting analytical results in specific applications, and it is possible to estimate the 
model econometrically,  which enables one to conduct policy experiments for specific 
polities.  In this section I present four applications of PUNE. 
A. Progressive taxation 
 We observe that, in all advanced democracies, income taxation is progressive, in 
the sense that marginal tax rates rise with income.  Why is this so?  A standard answer 
has been that progressive taxation seems fair.    Many , however, would consider this 
explanation not to be parsimonious: it would be better to have a completely 
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‘political’explanation, one that did not presuppose any assumption that citizens are 
motivated by a sense of justice or fairness.  Thus, one can ask, will the income-tax 
proposals that survive in cut-throat democratic competition be progressive ones?  An 
early discussion of this problem is due to Kramer and Snyder (1988), which takes a 
Downsian approach, and places an ad hoc assumption on the nature of the policy space in 
order to produce equilibria.  The unidimensional Downsian and Wittman models are ill-
equipped to answer this question.  The standard unidimensional policy space of tax 
regimes consists of the set of affine income tax functions, characterized by a constant 
marginal tax rate (in the interval [0,1]) and a lump-sum transfer to all, financed by that 
tax rate.    None of these tax regimes have increasing marginal tax rates.    Now one could 
work with a unidimensional policy space constructed to possess both convex and concave 
tax functions, but the unidimensional restriction is really too constraining.  The ideal 
model is one that poses a space of tax policies that is genuinely multi-dimensional, and 
contains both progressive and regressive tax functions. 
 In Roemer (1999), the tax-function space contains all quadratic income tax 
functions, constrained to require that no citizen pay a tax greater than her income, and 
that after-tax income be non-decreasing in pre-tax income (an incentive-compatibility 
constraint).  This is a two dimensional policy space.   We posit a distribution of income-
earning capacities (wages).  Citizens desire only to maximize their after-tax income --
they have no desire for leisure-- and so everyone works at his full capacity.  The income 
tax is purely redistributive (no public goods).  We study the two-party PUNEs of this 
model.  It is shown that, if the median income is less than mean income, then in every 
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PUNE10, the probability that a progressive tax scheme wins the election is unity.  (In 
other words, either both parties propose progressive schemes, or if not, the one proposing 
a regressive scheme wins with probability zero.)   Here, then, is a completely ‘positive’ 
explanation of the ubiquity of progressive taxation11. 
B. The effect of non-economic issues on taxation 
 In the introduction, I wrote that a central reason to model political competition as 
multi-dimensional is that apparently non-economic issues can affect political outcomes 
on economic issues.   Suppose that the electorate is concerned with two issues, taxation 
and religion.   (Religion is a place-holder for many other issues, of course.)  Thus, voters 
have preferences over the tax policy and the religious policy of the state, and parties 
compete on this policy space.   To be specific, let us suppose that a voter’s type is a pair 
(w,ρ), a policy is a pair (t,r), mean income is µ and the voter’s utility function is: 
 v(t,r;w,ρ) = (1− t)w + tµ −α (r − ρ)2    (5.1) 
Thus, w is this voter’s income, ρ is the voter’s religious position, t is an affine income tax 
which distributes the lump-sum tµ to all citizens, and the voter’s preferences over the 
religious issue are Euclidean (she suffers a quadratic loss as the state’s policy becomes 
farther away from her religious view).      We call α the salience of the religious issue, 
which is here assumed to be the same for all citizens. 
 Here the space of types is two-dimensional, as is the policy space.  Given a 
distribution of types F, the environment is complete, and we can study the two-party 
                                                 
10 There is, as usual, a 2-manifold of PUNEs. 
11 An extension for future research would be to study this problem on a small-
dimensional space of piece-wise linear tax functions, which are prevalent in reality.  The 
problem of characterizing PUNEs on such a space is much harder than on the space of 
quadratic functions. 
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PUNEs.  The question is: when do citizens’ views on the religious issue affect the 
equilibrium tax rates proposed by the parties in PUNEs? 
 If α=0, this model reduces to a unidimensional model on tax policies, and it is not 
hard to show that in the endogenous-party Wittman equilibrium,  the two parties consist 
of the ‘poor’ and the ‘rich’, and they propose tax rates of one and zero, respectively.  This 
is the bench-mark.   We can ask: Is it ever the case that, when α is positive, both parties 
propose a tax rate of zero  (or a tax rate of one)?  That would show that religious views 
can have an extreme effect on economic policy. 
 The answer is there is such a case.  Suppose the following condition on the 
distribution F holds: 
 
Condition A.   The mean income of the cohort of voters who hold the median religious 
view is greater than mean income in the population as a whole. 
 
Then it can be shown  (see Roemer (1998, 2001)) that if α is sufficiently large, and if 
uncertainty is sufficiently small, then in all PUNEs, both parties propose a tax rate of 
zero!   Correspondingly, if we change ‘greater’ to ‘less’  in the statement of Condition A, 
then the conclusion is that, in all PUNEs, both parties propose a tax rate of one. 
 An intuition behind this result is as follows.  As α gets large, the model 
approaches one where political competition is unidimensional, and the only policy is the 
religious issue.   If uncertainty is small, then in such competition, both parties will 
propose policies close to the ideal policy of the voter(s) with the median religious view.  
But if this cohort of voters has income greater than the mean, on average, then they want 
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zero taxation.    Conversely, if this cohort has mean income less than the mean, they want 
a tax rate of one.    
 The substantial result is that convergence of both parties to proposing a tax rate of 
zero, if Condition A holds, happens at finite α  and with a positive degree of uncertainty. 
 More generally, the comparative static is that as α increases, the tax rates 
proposed in PUNEs fall.   In other words, we should see economic policy moving to the 
right(left), as the salience of the religious increases, if Condition A (resp.,  its negation, ) 
holds.   
 The applications of this result seem myriad.  The religious issue could be 
nationalism, racism, language policy, civil rights, etc.   In part D below, I discuss an 
application where  the second issue is  ‘racial policy’ in the US.. 
 
C.  The flypaper effect 
 It has been noted by many authors that an increase in the wealth of a community 
by one unit engenders a smaller increase in the level of locally financed public goods 
than an increase by one unit of a federal grant to the community engenders: Hines and 
Thaler (1995) find that a federal grant increases the financing of public goods by about 
$637 per thousand dollars of the grant, a substantially greater increment than occurs with 
an increase in the community’s average wealth by an equivalent amount.   This has been 
dubbed the flypaper effect.  Many authors have viewed it as an anomaly, because if the 
community is assumed to be composed of homogeneous citizens, the increase in the 
supply of the public good should be identical in the two cases.   
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 However, if the community is heterogeneous in income, but homogeneous in 
preferences over income and the public good, the flypaper effect is predicted 
theoretically.     
 How should one model the political problem here?  There are two things to be 
decided: the tax policy and the value of the public good.  This can be done on a 
unidimensional policy space, if one restricts taxation to be proportional to income, and 
finances the public good from the tax revenues.   So a Downsian formulation is possible.  
Indeed, with a Downsian formulation, we do predict the flypaper effect, with 
heterogeneous incomes. 
 But proportional taxation is unusual.  More realistically, tax policy is affine -- a 
constant marginal tax rate and a transfer payment to all citizens.  Thus, here we have, 
naturally, a two dimensional policy space: three variables must be chosen -- the income 
tax rate, the lump sum transfer payment to all citizens, and the value of the public good.  
The budget constraint states that tax revenues must equal the sum of transfers and the 
public good, so the policy space is two dimensional. 
 Roemer and Silvestre (2002) model the problem using PUNE.   We parameterize 
the model to the US income distribution, and choose some reasonable values for the 
parameters of the utility function, which determine the relative preference of citizens for 
private income and the public good.   We compute PUNEs for three economies: 
E1.  An economy at date zero, with a given distribution of income; 
E2.  An economy at date one, with the same distribution of income and a external 
subsidy of $1000 per capita; 
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E3. An economy at date one, with the distribution of income whose mean is 
$1000 more than in E1, and no external subsidy. 
 
 Each PUNE consists of two policy proposals (by the two parties) and the 
probability of Left victory.   We take the expected expenditure on public goods as the 
value to examine.    There is a 2-manifold of PUNEs: we take the average of the expected 
expenditures on public goods over this manifold.  We find that the political equilibria in 
E2 have expected expenditures on public goods that are $635 higher than the political 
equilibria in E1: this is almost exactly the average found in the Hines and Taylor (1995) 
studies.   It is substantially more than the increase in expected expenditures in the move 
from E1 to E3, which is $157. 
D.  The effect of racism on redistribution in the US 
 In Lee and Roemer (2004), we take the ‘religious’ issue of section 5B above to be 
the race issue in the United States.  We fit a model of citizen preferences to the US polity, 
and attempt to compute the effect of racism in the electorate on the degree of 
redistribution that takes place through income-tax policy, where the policy space is two 
dimensional , representing income taxation and the position of the party on the race 
question.     We fit the model to the data for every presidential election in the period 
1976-1992, achieving an excellent fit.  We then conduct counterfactual experiments, 
asking what the equilibrium would be on the tax rate dimension, if the degree of voter 
racism should decline.  (The distribution of voter racism is estimated from the American 
National Election Studies.)  The punch line is that (we predict) the marginal tax rate 
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would increase by at least ten points, were American voters not racist,  making the US 
fiscal system much closer in size to that of the northern European democracies. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 We have argued that in modern democracies, , an understanding of the apparatus 
of political competition, whereby citizens with divergent interests organize to battle for 
control of state policy, is of the highest importance.  In this chapter, we have discussed 
only one of the several arenas of political competition: general popular elections. Indeed, 
contemporary practice lags reality: the vast majority of scholarly papers in political 
economy model political competition using the Hotelling-Downs apparatus, one which 
predicts that, in two-party competition, both parties propose the same policy.  Were this 
indeed the case, it is hard to understand how parties would finance themselves: what 
motivation would the rational citizen have to contribute to one party over another in such 
a situation?    Moreover, the Hotelling-Downs model is incapable of describing political 
competition which is complex, in the sense of taking place over several issues.    All 
general elections are concerned with a multitude of issues. 
 We argued that a variation on Wittman’s model provides a superior description of 
reality to Hotelling-Downs in the unidimensional context.    The basic data of a political 
environment -- preferences of citizens and the policy space -- determine a partition of 
citizens into two parties, an equilibrium pair of policy proposals, and a probability that 
each party wins the election.    The model can be estimated and its predictions tested. 
 Neither the Hotelling-Downs model nor the endogenous-party Wittman model 
generally possess equilibria, however, when the policy space is multi-dimensional.  We 
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proposed that the way to solve this problem is not to complexify the concept of Nash 
equilibrium (to a stage game, for instance) but rather to further articulate the conception 
of what a party is.    Parties are, in reality, complex institutions, and they are the soul of 
modern democracy: hence, good modeling impels us to think carefully about what parties 
are.  We proposed to think of the decision markers in parties as forming factions, with 
different concerns: Opportunists, Reformists, and Militants or Guardians.    Inter-party 
competition is strategic, in the sense of Nash equilibrium; intra-party competition is 
‘cooperative’ in the sense of Nash bargaining among factions.  (Thus our PUNE can be 
thought of as a ‘Nash-Nash’ equilibrium.)  Formally, the PUNE is a generalization of 
both Hotelling-Downs and endogenous-party Wittman equilibrium, but unlike those two 
special cases, PUNEs exist with multi-dimensional policy spaces.    We argued that 
interesting analytical results can be derived about PUNE in specific applications, and 
moreover, the model can be fit to data, in order to study policy and comparative statics 
for actual political-economies. 
 The models described here have all been ones of perfectly representative 
democracy.   In the PUNE, every citizen is a member (constituent) of one party, and each 
party aggregates the preferences of its constituent types according to their population 
sizes.    This is an ideal type of party behavior.  In the US, where private financing of 
parties is the norm, one might expect that parties would represent their contributors 
according to their contributions,  rather than their constituents according to their 
numbers.   The models of this chapter can be generalized to study that kind of imperfectly 
representative democracy (see Roemer [2003b]).   
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 Moreover, we have stayed with the assumption of two parties.  The citizen-
candidate model allows the number of candidates to be endogenous: however, there are 
so many equilibria, that it can hardly be said to have determined the number of 
candidates.   PUNE can be generalized to deal with more than two parties.   But it must 
be said that models with more than two parties are inherently more complex, because the 
natural political game then has two stages: first, an election, and second,  the formation of 
a government among a set of parties that comprise a majority coalition. 12.  That 
coalition-formation process must be modeled, and then the citizen-voter must take into 
account the nature of that process when she votes. There is no conceptual problem in 
using the PUNE concept to study multi-dimensional political competition with several 
parties: the main conceptual issue, about which disagreement among political scientists 
persists, is the nature of the coalition-formation process in the second stage. 
 Many open questions are posed by the factional approach to party competition.      
What are the microfoundations of the formation of the particular factions I have 
presumed to exist?  Do voters form factions?  How do candidates emerge from factional 
bargaining?  Can we formulate a theory of  how the results of primary elections influence 
the bargaining powers of factions?  More generally, how can one endogenize the relative 
bargaining powers of the factions?   In a federal system, one might conceive of factions 
in national parties as representing different regional interests.   This, too, would suffice to 
provide existence of equilibria in multi-dimensional competition, as long as the regional 
interests were suitably different. 
                                                 
12 Reality is still more complex.  There are times when governments are formed by 
coalitions that together won less than one-half the votes.   
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 Finally, to return to a point alluded to much earlier, how does the Arrow 
Impossibility Theorem fit into all this?   To see, we must first formulate the political 
environments described here as Arrovian environments.  Thus, let the set of social 
alternatives be lotteries whose elements are policy pairs taken from the given policy 
space.   A profile is a function {v(⋅;h) | h ∈ H} where h  is distributed according to F.  A 
social choice function maps a profile into orderings of social alternatives.  We could take 
the ordering of lotteries associated with a given profile to be as follows: all lotteries that 
are engendered by PUNEs are socially indifferent, and all other lotteries are socially 
indifferent, and inferior to the ones generated by PUNEs.    This social choice function 
violates the Arrow postulates as follows: 
•  it is not defined on preferences but on utility functions, which must be cardinally 
unit comparable  (or else adding up [ integrating] members’ utilities to form the 
party’s utility function makes no sense); 
•  it is not Pareto efficient (in fact, each party proposes, in a PUNE, a policy that is a 
Pareto efficient social alternative, but the lottery between these policies, 
engendered because of uncertainty, might not be Pareto efficient, because of risk 
aversion); 
•  the axiom of binary independence of alternatives fails. 
In the modified Arrovian framework, where utility functions are cardinally unit 
comparable, the unique social choice function to satisfy the Arrovian axioms is 
utilitarianism13: but certainly the PUNE is not the utilitarian rule.   
                                                 
13 See d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977, Theorem 3); also Roemer(1996, Theorem 1.4). 
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 Does this mean that political equilibrium, as we have described it in this chapter, 
is not a legitimate way for a society to aggregate its members’ preferences?  Hardly; it 
means the Arrovian framework is not the right abstraction to capture the nature of 
political competition.    (Let me simply note that if Nash equilibrium is involved in 
political competition, we cannot expect outcomes to be Pareto efficient, immediately 
violating an Arrovian axiom.)    Although it is desirable to have Pareto efficient 
outcomes, that might not be compatible with democratic competition.  
 To put the same point somewhat differently, defining the set of feasible 
allocations for a society in the classical way is an apolitical approach.  Why should some 
allocations be ‘feasible’ if there are no political institutions that could bring them about?  
The same point has been made with regard to asymmetric information:  Why should an 
allocation be regarded as ‘feasible14’ if asymmetric information makes it impossible for it 
ever to be brought about?  The constraint of asymmetric information is just as real as a 
technological constraint;  similarly,  a complex society must have politics, and it is 
therefore myopic to conceive of feasibility apolitically.      
  
                                                 
14 For instance, one achieved through certain kinds of lump sum taxation. 
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